Carnegie Mellon
Policy & Law Review

Introduction

Ukraine’s naval drones have done what few thought possible: crippled Russia’s once-dominant Black Sea Fleet, marking one of the Russia-Ukraine War’s most unexpected victories. In a stunning display of new technology, Ukraine’s domestically developed Uncrewed Surface Vessels (USVs) have sunk or damaged 19 Russian ships, shot down advanced Russian fighters, and destroyed numerous missile systems thought completely safe by Russia. As a result, Russia’s Black Sea Fleet (BSF) has retreated entirely from waters around Crimea, and Ukrainian President Vladimir Zelenskyy recently declared, “We control the situation in the Black Sea.”¹

In a major upset to conventional naval power, Ukraine’s navy—with no significant surface warships—has prevailed over Russia’s once-feared Black Sea Fleet. The history of this fight reveals the power of new technology and tactics and the danger of outdated thinking reliant on established doctrine. Ukraine’s USV development and deployment promise a new era of uncrewed naval warfare that will echo through future naval conflicts.  

The Main Players

The main institutional players responsible for building and operating Ukraine’s USVs are Ukrainian defence intelligence, the DIU, and Ukrainian internal security, the SBU. Originally, the DIU and the SBU worked together in organizing early USV attacks, but they split in 2023 and have since developed a fierce institutional rivalry over USV operations.²

The DIU operates the Magura line of USVs. The Magura 5—the most widely used model—has a reported speed of 22 knots cruising and 42 knots max,³ a range of 450 nautical miles (approximately 833 km), a payload of 320 kg, and costs around $250,000.⁴ The DIU recently introduced improved versions in the Magura 7 and the Magura 6 models, though it’s unclear which attacks these USVs have participated in.⁵

The SBU operates the Seababy line of USVs, which has a reported max speed of 49 knots, a range of 540 nautical miles (1,000 km) with additional fuel tanks, a payload of 850 kg, and a cost of $221,000.⁶ Whether the Seababy is actually better in terms of top speed, range, payload, and cost than the Magura 5 is uncertain. Performance numbers for the Seababy and Magura 5 are self-reported by Ukraine. Thus, these specifications should be taken as general estimates.

2022 Naval Drone History

The SBU and DIU began building USVs in June of 2022. The first iterations were simple explosive-laden ramming vessels with a speedboat-type hull, jet-ski engine or outboard motor, front-facing camera, prow-attached detonator, communications terminal, and a hold full of explosives. These prototypes were ready by September of 2022, but they performed poorly in a September 17th mission to attack the BSF moored at Sevastopol. Early models were prone to sink or explode, and all were ultimately hampered by their Starlink satellite connections, which automatically shut off 70 kilometres away from the port during the September 17th mission. Only two USVs made it back to Ukraine,⁷ while another was recovered by Russian authorities, who puzzled over the novel design.⁸

The group’s next attempt went much better. On the morning of October 29th, 2022, seven Magura 3 USVs tore into Russia’s main naval base in Sevastopol, hunting for targets. One Magura successfully hit Russia’s new Black Sea flagship, the multi-role frigate, Admiral Makarov, and another hit the minesweeper Ivan Golubets. Other USVs were engaged by a Russian Mi-8 helicopter, which managed to destroy at least one USV. 

Russia appeared completely caught off guard during the attack, with neither ship nor harbor defenses firing back at the USVs. In the ensuing confusion, Admiral Makarov was also fired upon by Russian shore artillery before identifying herself.

Footage of the October 29th, 2022, attack on Admiral Makarov can be found here.

The only other Ukrainian attack in 2022 was on November 18th, when USVs targeted port and oil infrastructure in Novorossiysk Harbor. While the attack did little damage, it did display the extended range of Ukrainian USVs, as Novorossiysk is 200 miles farther east than Sevastopol, requiring more extensive travel.

2022 Analysis

Ukraine’s 2022 USV operations were a mixed bag. The Sevastopol and Novorossiysk operations were successful proofs of concept, showing USVs could damage the BSF. Still, the operations were relatively limited in scope, focused on easy-to-hit targets in port, and were largely successful because Russia had been caught completely off guard. By the end of 2022, the BSF was still operating with little fear, and it seemed likely that it would find a way to counter Ukrainian USVs. 

2023 Naval Drone History

2023 saw Ukraine significantly expand its USV operations with 11 separate attacks. Six attacks were successful. In June of 2023, two USVs damaged the Kerch Strait Bridge, one of Russia’s main links to Crimea. The bridge was not fully repaired till October. On August 3rd and 4th, USVs heavily damaged the large landing ship Olenegorsky Gornyak and the tanker Sig in Novorossiysk harbor. On September 14th, a USV struck the missile corvette Samum just outside Sevastopol. On October 11th, the patrol ship, Pavel Derzhavin, struck a mine laid by a Ukrainian USV and had to be towed into port. Finally, on November 10th, Ukraine sank two landing craft, a Serna and Ondatra class, anchored in Chornomorske Harbor, marking the first time they had sunk combat ships with their USVs.

Ukraine also had five unsuccessful attacks in 2023. On March 23rd, Russia repelled a combined USV, UAV (unmanned aerial vehicle) attack on Sevastopol harbor. On May 26th, the intelligence ship Ivan Khurs repelled a USV attack near the coast of Turkey. On July 25th, August 1st, and September 4th, Vasily Bykov-class patrol boats repelled similar attacks several hundred miles southwest of Sevastopol while escorting Russian cargo ships to the Bosphorus Strait. It’s unclear how many USVs were destroyed in these attacks.

Footage of the August 3rd, 2023, attack on Olenegorsky Gornyak can be found here.

2023 Analysis

2023 revealed the strengths and weaknesses of Ukrainian USVs and Ukraine’s flawed efforts to move beyond a proof of concept. The USVs were incredibly effective at attacking fixed or slow-moving targets. The Kerch Bridge, Sig, and the Serna and Ondatra class landing craft were stationary targets while the Olenegorsky Gornyak and Samum were moving slowly, having just gotten underway. USVs also benefited from the element of surprise in their successful attacks. Ukraine ensured surprise by attacking at night in harbors likely assumed safe by Russian commanders. An unsuspecting Russian navy hardly fired back during these successful attacks, allowing Ukraine’s lightly armored USVs time to hit their targets. A quick strike before Russia had time to mount a significant defense was clearly a winning tactic. 

Ukraine’s failures, however, also showed its USVs’ limitations. Its attacks in open water on the Ivan Khurs and Vasily Bykov-class patrol boats all failed. In open water, Russian warships had ample time to detect incoming USVs and plenty of room to maneuver. Conversely, Ukrainian USVs were hampered by a lack of armor—making them incredibly vulnerable to defensive fire—and a slow top speed—giving Russia plenty of time to hit its targets. USVs were also limited by a lack of explosive power. Single USV hits only managed to sink small ships like the 60 and 100-ton Serna and Ondatra class landing craft. Larger vessels like the 2768-ton Olenegorsky Gornyak were damaged but returned to service. Clearly, Ukraine would need to shift tactics, focusing on multiple hits to larger ships and avoiding unfavorable open-water attacks.

Footage of the November 10th, 2024, sinking of Serna and Ondatra class landing ships can be found here.

Finally, 2023 also showed Ukraine’s willingness to experiment with new technology. The March 22nd Sevastopol Harbor raid was a failure, but marked the first USV-UAV combined attack in history. Ukraine would hone this combined arms approach in the following years and use it to deadly effect in 2025. Additionally, Ukraine experimented with the minelaying capabilities of USVs in its November 13th attack. Notably, it seems to have dropped this technology since, with no other mention of minelaying USVs—it is possible Ukraine has continued to lay mines without media attention, but mines in general have still not scored any reported hits since the strike on Pavel Dervazhin. The embrace of combined USV-UAV attacks and the dropping of minelaying technology demonstrates Ukraine’s willingness to quickly embrace effective strategies and forgo ineffective ones. 

2024 Naval Drone History

2024 was by far Ukraine’s most successful year in attacking the BSF. It again carried out 11 attacks, saw 10 of them succeed, and sank eight Russian ships. On January 21st, USVs sank the 480-ton missile corvette Ivanovets off the coast of western Crimea, marking the first major warship sunk by USVs. This was followed by a February 14th attack, which sank the large landing ship Tsezar Kunikov, and a March 5th attack, which sank the brand new patrol ship Sergei Kotov, both off the coast of western Crimea.

GoPro footage from the February 14th, 2024, sinking of the Tsezar Kunikov can be found here.

Ukraine also struck harbors like Vuzka Bay, where they destroyed a Mangust-class patrol ship on May 6th and two KS-701 Tunets (Tuna) patrol ships on May 30th. On June 6th, USVs breached defensive booms in Chornomorske harbor and sank a moored Saturn Class tugboat, and two days later, USVs damaged the tugboat Inzhener Smirnov and a barge near the Kerch bridge. On July 18th, it was strikes on shore facilities during a Russian training exercise near Lake Donuzlav. On August 9th, in simultaneous strikes, USVs heavily damaged a natural gas extraction rig, Marine Stationary Platform No. 17, and sank another Tunets Patrol Boat in Chornomorske harbor. 

Ukraine only had one failed attack in 2024 when, on July 3rd, USVs again tried to infiltrate Novorossiysk Harbor but were destroyed by Russian defensive fire.

2024 Analysis

Russia was again caught by surprise, despite Ukraine’s previous USV success. The Mangust Class patrol ship, the Saturn Class tugboat, and the Tunets boats were all caught at anchor. While the Ivanovets, Tsezar Kunikov, and Sergei Kotov lacked helicopter and fighter support, despite being close to major Russian air bases. Ukraine also caught the Ivanovets, Tsezar Kunikov, and Sergei Kotov close to shore, where each ship likely had difficulty detecting the attacking USVs and lacked enough room to maneuver. 

Additionally, Ukraine changed its USV tactics to emphasize more swarm attacks, which aimed for multiple hits on the same ship. (It is possible Ukraine had tried these swarm tactics in 2023, but had simply failed in getting multiple USVs close to their targets. Either way, they did in 2024.). These swarm tactics were most apparent with the Ivanovets, which was hit at least three times, the Tsezar Kunikov, which was hit six times, and the Sergei Kotov, which was hit five times. These swarm tactics finally gave Ukraine the explosive power to sink major warships.

Footage of the January 21st, 2024, sinking of the Ivanovets can be found here.

Ukraine also innovated with its first attack on Chornomorske. It first used a “breach” boat to destroy an outer boom, likely put in place by Russia to block USVs. From there, at least two other USVs were able to enter the harbor and sink a Saturn-class tugboat. This attack demonstrated that basic Russian defenses, like a boom, were not enough to keep out USVs. 

Altogether, over seven months, Ukrainian USVs sank eight Russian warships with a total value of around $240 million, including one of Russia’s newest warships, the Sergei Kotov, which was commissioned in 2022. During these attacks, Russia never displayed the capability to defeat a USV swarm, and soon after these losses, it shifted much of its Black Sea Fleet out of Sevastopol for safer eastern ports, conceding Crimean waters to Ukraine.⁹ The risk to the BSF’s most expensive warships had become greater than any operational benefit they provided. Ukraine had won a stunning victory, becoming the dominant force in the Black Sea.

While a great success for Ukraine, 2024 still showed many of its USVs’ limitations. All of the successful attacks happened against targets that were stationary, slow-moving, or denied full freedom of maneuver. Surprise also remained a key element for Ukraine’s USVs, as Russian harbor defenses could easily repel USVs with some warning, as seen by the failed Novorossiysk Harbor attack on July 3rd. Ukraine had done a great job against this specific subset of targets, but would be forced to adapt in 2025 as the BSF retreated and Russian harbor defenses improved.

2025 Naval Drone History

From December 2024 to July 2025, Ukraine carried out nine attacks using USVs. At least eight of them were successful. These attacks featured modified USVs armed with new weapons and UAVs. Ukraine’s first attack on December 6th, 2024, near the Kerch bridge featured the first modifications as Ukraine mounted machine guns to its USVs, which in turn repelled Russian helicopters sent to destroy them. Ukraine claimed to have damaged an Mi-8 helicopter, killing some of the crewmen. This was the first documented instance of Ukraine mounting kinetic weapons on its USVs. 

December 7th also saw another first. Ukraine attacked at least two Black Sea gas platforms using USV-launched UAVs. These explosive-laden UAVs attacked the upper infrastructure of the gas platforms, while traditional suicide ramming USVs attacked the seaside support beams. This was the first documented instance of UAVs being deployed from USVs for combat. Ukraine would use the same tactic on May 19th to damage another Black Sea gas platform.

Footage of the December 7th, 2024, USV-UAV combined attack on Black Sea gas platforms can be found here.

The next major engagement after December 7th was on December 31st, when Russian Mi-8 helicopters engaged Ukrainian USVs, only to find the USVs armed with the air-to-air Vympel R-73 missile system. In the following engagement, Ukraine downed one Mi-8 and damaged another, marking the first shootdown of an air combatant from a USV (Ukraine had almost certainly tried this tactic before, but this was the first successful instance, and thus it received much more media attention and documentation). Ukraine would repeat this feat on May 6th when USVs downed two modern SU-30 fighter jets using AIM-9X air-to-air missiles. 

Footage of December 31st, 2024, shootdown of Mi-8 helicopter can be found here.

Finally, Ukraine would use its ability to launch UAVs from USVs to strike vulnerable land targets in Crimea. The first instance was on January 6th near the village of Khorly when USV-launched UAVs destroyed a Pantsir-S1 surface-to-air (SAM) missile system. This was followed on March 3rd when USV-launched UAVs destroyed an Osa-AKM and 9K35 Strela 10 SAM vehicles. Again on June 26th, USV-launched UAVs damaged parts of an S-400 Triumf SAM system, including two 92N2E multifunction radar stations, two 91N6E detection radars, and one S-400 missile launcher. Finally, on July 2nd, USV-launched UAVs damaged a Nebo-M radar system near the town of Mayak. Notably, this attack featured another first as Ukrainian UAVs were equipped to drop bombs and return to their USVs instead of ramming their targets in a suicide-style attack. 

Footage of the June 26th, 2025, attack on the S-400 Triumf SAM system can be found here.

2025 Analysis

In total, during 2025, Ukraine’s USVs destroyed or damaged systems worth over $745 million and achieved many impressive firsts with its modified USVs. In only three years, Ukraine’s USVs had become floating bombs, minelayers, missile platforms, machine gun platforms, and UAV launchers. This customizability was especially necessary in 2025 when the BSF withdrawal drastically reduced the need for suicide ramming attacks and forced Ukraine to look to the land and air for new targets. 

Surprise was again crucial for success as USV-launched UAVs faced no defensive fire before destroying SAM and radar systems—likely because Russian commanders had assumed they were safe since they were out of range of land-based Ukrainian UAVs. Similarly, in the air, the Mi-8 helicopters and SU-30 fighter jets were likely flying low and slow to effectively fire on the USVs and were surprised by the USVs’ new mounted missiles. It is unlikely Russia will make these mistakes in the future. 

Thus, maintaining the element of surprise will likely force Ukraine to adapt again. This adaptation could be in the form of updated UAVs like the reusable bomber drone used in the July 2nd attack, longer-range weapons like those fitted to the GUR’s new Katran drone,¹⁰ which reportedly can hit targets 100 km away, or in underwater loitering munitions like Ukraine’s prototype Toloka TLK-150.¹¹ Regardless, 2025 proved Ukraine can adapt quickly to changing combat scenarios and harness the customizable nature of USVs to win the day. 

The Future

As the Russia-Ukraine war continues, Ukraine will need to adapt to keep control of the Black Sea with naval drones. Other powers must also take note of how drones have shifted the naval warfare landscape.

This article was only a preliminary analysis for Ukraine. A more detailed analysis of lessons other countries can learn from Ukraine’s success will be published in a future edition.  

Ultimately, the last three years of naval drone warfare illustrate the danger of outmoded thinking and the power of new technology and tactics to win the day. Ukraine’s ability to constantly adapt and harness new technology means it will continue to control the Black Sea for the foreseeable future.

Methodology

A quick note on methodology: the following history and analysis are based on a dataset of Ukrainian USV attacks compiled by the author (that dataset can be found here). Each attack was confirmed by multiple print and social media sources, as well as videos when possible. The dataset is meant to be comprehensive and includes every documented USV attack from September 2022 to July 2025. That being said, specific details, including the number of USVs used in each attack and relative damage, are estimations based on oftentimes contradictory information. The fog of war makes getting full details incredibly difficult.  

Endnotes