Carnegie Mellon
Policy & Law Review

Introduction

Ukrainian naval drones have helped win one of the most shocking victories of the Russia-Ukraine War. Here’s what the rest of the world needs to know.

Ukraine’s naval drones have played a key role in Ukraine’s Black Sea Victory.¹

Ukraine’s domestically developed Uncrewed Surface Vessels (USVs) have led the charge against Russia’s Black Sea Fleet (BSF), contributing to one of the most surprising victories of the war. In the last three years, Ukrainian USVs have sunk or damaged 19 Russian ships, shot down advanced Russian fighters, and destroyed numerous missile systems thought completely safe by Russia.² As a result, Russia’s navy has retreated entirely from waters around Crimea, and Ukrainian President Vladimir Zelenskyy recently declared, “We control the situation in the Black Sea.”³

This is part two of a series focused on Ukraine’s naval drone program. Part one focused on an attack-by-attack history of Ukraine’s naval drone program and can be found here. Part two will focus on the limits of Ukraine’s USVs and the lessons large navies like the United States can draw from Ukraine’s success.

Lesson 1: Suicide USVs Aren’t Like Suicide UAVs

At first, it’s easy to imagine Ukraine’s USVs as agile ship killers capable of single-handedly challenging Russia’s larger warships. This narrative closely matches the success of Ukraine’s unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) which have managed to destroy much larger tanks and armored transports. In reality, Ukraine’s suicide USVs are much more limited than their UAV counterparts.

Suicide UAVs have proven deadly effective against armored vehicles.⁴

USVs are much slower than UAVs: Ukrainian UAVs regularly reach speeds over 70 mph while USVs generally top out around 56 mph.^{5 6} Additionally, USVs are less maneuverable as they lack a vertical movement axis and cannot corner or reverse at high speeds. Less speed and maneuverability mean enemy gunners have a much easier time hitting USVs, and with their light armor, any hit from machine gun or rifle fire is enough to destroy a USV.

The ease with which a well-prepared crew can destroy a suicide USV is clearly seen in the attack on the Russian intelligence ship Ivan Khurs. Released footage shows that a single hit from one of the ships’ 14.5 mm machine guns was enough to destroy a charging suicide USV.⁷

To overcome this weakness, Ukrainian suicide USVs have heavily relied on surprising their targets and avoiding defensive fire altogether: 9 of the 18 ships sunk or damaged by Ukrainian suicide USVs were caught at anchor and put up no defense, while six others were caught in unfavorable positions near the coast, suggesting near total surprise. Ukraine has increased its chance of surprising Russian targets by attacking almost exclusively at night and often using the Crimean coastline as cover to prevent sustained tracking. Importantly, no documented USV attack has been successful without the element of surprise.⁸ Thus, while Ukraine’s USVs have been successful, their need for surprise means they are much more limited than their UAV counterparts.

Lesson 2: Timely Intelligence, Calm Seas, and Constant Communication are Critical

Timely Intelligence

Timely intelligence enables the surprise discussed in Lesson 1. Ukraine needs to know where vulnerable Russian targets are and be able to dispatch USVs before that opportunity disappears. Furthermore, it needs to ensure Russia remains unaware of its operations to maintain surprise. Without good intelligence, surprise is nearly impossible.

The high level of surprise across all Ukrainian attacks discussed in Lesson 1 indicates Ukraine has won the intelligence battle over the BSF. The US has supported Ukraine in this intelligence battle, reportedly providing targeting information on Ukraine’s first USV attack in Sevastopol in 2022.⁹ The US intelligence sharing has likely extended to many of Ukraine’s successful USV attacks.

Calm Seas

Ukraine’s USVs can’t effectively operate in higher sea states because of their small size. In rough seas, suicide drones can’t match the speed of larger warships, which can more easily cut through larger waves. This was clearly demonstrated in the attack on the Admiral Makarov, where a secondary strike on the warships failed because “massive waves [prevented the USVs] from making contact.”¹⁰ Higher sea states also affect Ukraine’s missile-carrying USVs, which generally require a visual lock and thus a stable platform to acquire their targets. The same negative effects likely extend to UAV-carrying USVs, which may struggle to launch their UAVs in rough waters. Thus, sea state affects all of Ukraine’s USVs much more than larger warships.

Constant Communication

One of drone technology’s biggest weaknesses is the need to maintain a near-constant communication link between drone and operator. USVs are no different. Most notably, Ukraine’s first attempt to attack Sevastopol harbor in 2022 was aborted when the USVs’ Starlink satellite connections were cut off by a geofence around Crimea.¹¹ Since then, Ukraine has largely overcome communication issues between its pilots and their USVs, likely using multiple redundant communication links. In 2023, a captured Ukrainian USV had “three distinct high-bandwidth SATCOM arrays and…one low-bandwidth SATCOM antenna.”¹²  Multiple arrays likely allow Ukraine to switch between frequencies in the case of Russian jamming and also provide redundancy if one communication link ceases to function.

A captured Ukrainian USV with four distinct satellite communication arrays.¹³

Despite Ukraine having largely avoided communication problems, it is still likely to turn to autonomous systems to avoid the need for communication altogether going forward. AI systems have already been incorporated successfully into Ukrainian UAVs. For example, in July of 2024, suicide UAVs equipped with an AI system successfully destroyed a column of Russian tanks despite Russian jamming efforts.¹⁴ Ukraine is reportedly already experimenting with similar systems in its USVs.¹⁵ However, until such systems become widespread, constant communication will remain a key to Ukrainian USV success.

Lesson 3: A USV Isn’t Deadly, a USV Swarm is

Ukraine’s USVs are far less capable as individuals than the weapons systems they seek to destroy. Almost all of Ukraine’s USVs are limited to a single strike using one type of weapon. As a result, Ukraine’s most successful USV attacks have had to use multiple USVs deployed in a swarm to destroy bigger targets. This is most clearly seen with the BSF ships Ivanovets, Tzezar Kunikov, and Sergei Kotov, which each took five to six direct USV hits before sinking.¹⁶

USVs rely on distributed destructive power, meaning many drones have to successfully strike a target to achieve the same damage as a more complex weapons system. On the one hand, this approach increases survivability as an enemy must strike multiple targets successfully to defeat the attack. On the other hand, distributed destructive power introduces more failure points and increases the odds of an underpowered strike by too few platforms. Nevertheless, this principle of distributed destructive power is completely different than what most large navies train to deal with, and for Ukraine, it has proven deadly effective against the BSF.

Lesson 4: USVs Work, Small Navies Should Rejoice

USVs provide several major advantages for smaller navies. Firstly, USVs offer an incredibly beneficial cost asymmetry as cheap drones can destroy much more expensive weapons systems. For small navies, with small budgets, maintaining such cost asymmetry is a necessity against better-funded foes. Ukraine’s USVs have provided a clear blueprint: in 2025 alone, Ukrainian USVs destroyed Russian systems worth over $725 million, or the equivalent of almost 3,000 Ukrainian USVs.¹⁷ In contrast, Russia has not destroyed anywhere close to this many USVs in three years of combat, much less in 2025.

Secondly, the customizability of USVs gives small navies weapons platforms they would not otherwise have access to. In the last three years, Ukraine’s USVs have been suicide rammers, mine layers, missile launchers, machine gun platforms, and UAV launchers. Ukraine has continued to innovate with its latest USV, the Katran, equipped with torpedoes, a minigun, a machine gun, and a man-portable air defense system (MANPADS).¹⁸ Such customizability does not come at the cost of extensive R&D or investment, as many of these USV iterations have off-the-shelf weapons systems that every nation can access. This inexpensive customizability suits small navies unable to afford specialized ships for every combat role and consequently gives those navies a wider suite of options for naval operations.

Ukraine’s new Katran naval drone again demonstrates the versatility of the platform.¹⁹

Thirdly, USVs fit a new fast-paced era of warfare. Due to their small size, cheap production cost, and remote nature, USVs can be tested in the field without significant loss if things go wrong. This allows a quick cycle of trial-by-fire innovation, which has proven incredibly effective in producing successful prototypes for Ukraine: different Ukrainian USV types have struck Russian targets on land, sea, and air, while Russia always seemed one step behind. Thus, smaller navies can out-innovate larger ones with such a quick innovation cycle, challenging the status quo of naval power.

Lesson 5: USVs Work; Big Navies Must Prepare

For bigger navies, USVs represent a threat to their already established naval power and ships, not a new tool to undergird future expansion. Larger navies are not likely to adopt USVs to the same degree as Ukraine. As discussed in Lessons 2 and 3, USVs are still limited to mainly littoral environments, and their single-use nature means they won’t be replacing the aircraft carriers of blue water navies anytime soon. Larger navies are still likely to focus on bigger platforms that field a variety of capabilities and can operate globally. This focus on larger platforms will inherently limit a larger navy’s understanding of new USV technology and heighten the chance they are caught by surprise like the BSF.

Bigger nations must still be prepared for USV attacks in littoral environments, primarily with specialized crew training. The US Navy has already implemented some drills that prepare for USV attacks, and other larger navies are likely to follow suit.²⁰ As USV technology becomes more widespread and tested, the importance of these drills cannot be understated.

Big navies must also become comfortable with a faster development cycle for weapons. Ukraine has shown how quickly combat situations can change, developing its first combat USVs in three months and chasing off the BSF in under three years. In contrast, new US Navy ships are constantly delayed: most recently, the Block IV Virginia-class submarines were reportedly delayed by three years and the long-suffering Constellation-class frigate program was canceled after 5 years without delivering a single ship.^{21 22} While the US is an extreme case, most larger navies often have long or delayed development schedules for new ships and weapons. In taking this long to develop ships, a large navy risks building out-of-date ships and weapons.

Future Implications

USVs are here to stay. Large navies like the US, China, and yes, even Russia, will need to train their crews to fight off USV attacks, plan around USVs to prevent effective surprise attacks, and reform their development cycles to keep up with an increasingly accelerated pace of innovation embodied by USVs.

USVs, however, are still limited. They heavily rely on surprise, swarm attacks, and favorable weather conditions, typically found only in littoral environments. Nevertheless, Ukraine has demonstrated that those conditions can be met in real-world combat situations, especially when a larger navy is unprepared.

With easy customizability, low cost, and quick development time, USVs will spread to small navies looking to upset the status quo. It is an open question of how the world’s largest navies will respond. Ukraine’s Black Sea victory was merely the start of a revolution in naval warfare. The future is more uncertain.

Methodology

Both articles are based on a dataset of Ukrainian USV attacks compiled by the author (that dataset can be found here). Each attack was confirmed by multiple print and social media sources, as well as videos when possible. The dataset is meant to be comprehensive and includes every documented USV attack from September 2022 to July 2025. That being said, specific details, including the number of USVs used in each attack and relative damage, are estimations based on contradictory information. The fog of war makes getting full details incredibly difficult. 

Notes